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We have a strong intuition that human life of whatever stage has moral significance. Some argue that this is 'speciesism', in the same way that others direct accusations of racism when the claim is made that a greater moral significance should be placed on white human life as opposed to non-white. However, the claim for such moral significance need not stem purely from being a member of the species Homo sapiens. The claim may rest on the quality of human functioning which, in terms of conscious appreciation, interactions and behaviour, has moral weight over and above other biological life. The difficulty is that some human beings, including fetuses and embryos do not have these properties.
Potentiality
The standard potentiality argument argues that despite the fact that embryos do not have the properties now, they have the potential to develop them. They claim that if an embryo has the potential to be a person with 'the right to life', the right to life should apply before the 'stage' of being a person is reached. Thus they argue from the premise that one type of creature will change into something different to the conclusion that a creature of the first form has the moral properties of the second form. This is a 'consequentialist' view of potentiality. On this view, potential is not But there are many problems with this view of potentiality. First, it makes little sense to give an embryo rights that it may have at a later stage unless its potential is an inherent property which confers those rights. Surely we should form attitudes to things on the basis of what they are rather than what they might be? Second, there is the distinct possibility that any given embryo will never reach the stage of having those rights. But many embryos which spontaneously abort are no different from ones that will reach the potential later stage. Why should they have different properties? Third, just how far back ought these rights to be extended; should sperm and ova be included? (If so we ban contraception.)
Clearly potentiality needs somewhat more analysis and justification or it must be discarded altogether.
We will give a more Aristotelian analysis (1) and argue that the form of a human being extends beyond that present at a given slice of time to take in the breadth of an entire life. There is a phase of development, a phase ofmoral engagement with others and a phase of dying (which may be abrupt or more drawn out). On this view, the process of becoming a person is a progression through a series of linked developmental stages. Because each stage is an essential component of the whole, the form of humanity involves a life with a characteristic longitudinal 'shape'.
At one stage of this whole, the individual becomes a rational social being and an inherent moral value is realised. We then take this moral value, inherent to human beings as rational social beings (persons), and attach it to the form as a whole.
To do this is to evince a feature of our general reasoning. In the main, we look at a thing not only as what it is in itself but also in view of what it is part of. For example, a gunshot has different significance as part of a clay target shoot than as part of a murder. Thus we derive the moral status of an embryo from the whole of which that embryo is a part. An embryo has present applicable rights not because some time in the future that embryo may become a person with rights appropriate to persons but because it is the same individual who becomes a person. We accept that the embryo has these rights because as a phase of the human form, it has some claim to the rights we accord to persons. Now we must clarify when an embryo first has rights, what those rights are and how much moral weight they have, especially when they are in conflict with the rights of other persons.
Rights
What is a right? 'Essentially, rights are justified claims that require action or restraint from others -that is, impose positive or negative duties on others' (2).
The debate surrounding rights concerns both natural rights, which are contentious, and constitutional/legal rights which exist (without doubt) in our society because we have created them.
At present, British and New Zealand legislation gives limited constitutional rights to embryos and fetuses. For example, a fetus is protected from abortion unless certain legal criteria are met (3) . Religious and anti-abortion groups give an embryo certain rights which they believe to be implicit in its existence. These rights, it is claimed, do not require a law or act of parliament to create them, they are therefore natural rights.
In the debate surrounding the status of embryos the concept of natural human rights seems, clearly, to be important and we must therefore spend some time clarifying it. Such rights could either be God-given or intrinsic to the nature of human beings. In either case, one would need to reason about the lessons to be learnt (from creation/nature or from 'revealed laws') to develop a substantial conception of the moral rights concerned.
John Locke and his followers espoused natural human rights on the basis of secular thought. In this tradition, Hart claims that if there are any moral rights 'there is at least one natural right, the equal right of all men to be free' (4). This is close to Kant's view that all men have the right to be fully-functioning, autonomous agents. For pro-lifers, every human being also has a right to life and therefore should not be killed. Both stands appear to be based on a set of moral intuitions. However, such intuitions conflict, so they cannot provide sufficient grounds on which to assert that such rights exist.
Bentham and other utilitarians claim that natural rights are nonsense and that they exist purely as figments of our imagination (5, 6) . Non-utilitarian objections to moral rights are based either on the belief that codified, and therefore non-natural duties alone exist, or on scepticism about the possible source of moral rights. The extreme sceptic denies that in a state of nature any creature has rights. Therefore, questions arise as to whether natural/moral rights have been correctly identified and where they come from. If one could find a general basis for natural rights then one would be able to see whether embryos or fetuses fulfilled the requisite conditions to be credited with them.
The view favoured by the present authors is that natural rights arise when it goes against the intrinsic nature of moral thinking or moral agency to deprive an individual of the claim concerned. If compassion, for example, were seen to be at the heart of moral judgement in general, it follows that to act without it would be to fail in respect to one of the basic features constitutive ofmoral conduct (7) . We would argue that moral considerations arise in contexts where individuals interact with each other and develop reciprocal attitudes which guide their behaviour. These attitudes embed a sensitivity to the needs and vulnerabilities of others and involve a kind of empathy which informs actions which impinge upon what matters to others. Therefore, we internalise the norm that we should avoid, wherever possible, harming another person.
We combine this with the view that the potential to be a person is inherent in the whole (longitudinally realised) form of a human being. This implies that a human being, simply by having a form which at some stage will participate in moral interactions, has a right not to be the subject of gratuitous insult or injury.
The concept of longitudinal form
There is little doubt in most people's eyes that at some stage human beings have moral value. (We discuss this further later.) The difficulties arise when we endeavour to pinpoint when this stage is reached. However, if we look at the human form in a longitudinal way this problem becomes more tractable.
One can make an analogy with the colour spectrum. It is not possible to identify the exact point where one colour emerges from another because there are gradual transitions through a series of shades. Red emerges from an increasingly red shade of orange; it cannot be said to appear at a definable point. Thus, though distinctions can be made, real continuities still exist.
The adult, adolescent, child, viable fetus, pre-viable fetus, embryo, blastocyst and conceptus are similarly part of a continuum. It is not possible to determine the exact point separating adjacent stages. For this reason we cannot look at any point in the developmental process in isolation when attributing moral properties; we should look at the human being as having a single form which exists over time. Development is, therefore, a process whose overall nature may have distinct moral significance. The conceptus begins this process and the 'form' which not only governs the process but also makes it morally significant, is realised as time goes by.
Note that this view may confer some moral worth on the embryo even at fertilisation. If the initial stage in the human process does not occur none of the later stages can be reached and therefore this first stage is an essential component of the complex whole in the same way that the laying of foundations is the essential first stage of building a house. Who can say that any one stage of building a house is any more important than another when without all stages one has nothing? The conceptus may have moral significance because it is an essential component of the total longitudinal form of a morally signficant being (we will consider a modification of this derived status below).
The total form ofa human being exists through time. We can also say that a single individual makes up that form throughout its temporal existence. Therefore, if we can justify a moral value for that individual at one point in time, that moral value ought to be conferred on the total form throughout its temporal existence. Remaining consistent to our argument we analyse problems at all phases ofthat form with the same moral precepts. But, even though the moral value is the same this does not entail that the moral analysis will bring about the same conclusions.
The person as valuable
For Kant a person has 'rational willing agency as the essential characteristic' (8); for Locke 'the ability to think combined with self-awareness over time is the essence of personhood' (8). Both formulations exclude very young infants and humans with severely damaged or defective brains from the category of persons. This exclusion seems to go against our intuitive feeling that there ought to be some value at least placed on the lives of infants.
Such feelings are admittedly not reliable indicants of moral value (remember the feelings of Americans in the 'deep South' to black Africans), but they do give us a prima facie reason for questioning the validity of an exclusive definition of personhood. They also confirm the broadly Aristotelian view we have favoured because embryos, fetuses and infants are phases of beings whose form is such that they are to be valued as persons. (In the case of the severely brain-damaged we do not have the same metaphysical support for our intuitions based on potential, indeed the intuitions themselves are less clear.)
But, when does this human form, which is to be valued, begin?
In moral history a number of beginning points for human form have been considered. Quickening (at approximately twenty weeks gestation) is thought by some to be the first signs of personhood. This may be because the first fetal movements felt by the mother are thought to indicate ensoulment, or because such manifestations are the first communication between the mother and fetus. Birth is important to others (for example Engelhardt) for similar 'interactive' reasons. Engelhardt argues that, although a newborn infant has not yet become a person (as a subject of selfawareness), he/she expresses rudiments of human nature in interpersonal interactions (which include a form of communication) and is extended the right of membership of a social group because of that interaction (9) . Perceived membership of a moral community, on this view, gives some rights to the infant, including the right to life. The viability criterion could be favoured for much the same reasons -the fetus has reached a stage in development where it could survive ex utero in a human environment. It therefore has the rights of any individual who can and does interact in that environment. On this basis the viable fetus is credited with certain rights because it has a capacity for what is crucial in moral communities not because it currently expresses that capacity (note that the newborn infant is still dependent for viability on the human supports around it).
Let us accept that interaction in a human context (even if it is not fully reciprocal) places moral value on the life of the subject under consideration. But perhaps that morally significant interaction occurs much earlier in the gestational process than claimed by any of the arguments above (this would imply that the interaction does not have to be of an interpersonal type (10)).
What type of interaction is significant?
We have accepted that it is the degree to which a developing embryo or fetus becomes embedded in a human community which determines moral dues or rights. (This is congenial even to Kuhse and Singer (1 
1).)
When the blastocyst begins to implantapproximately six days after fertilisation -a physical interaction between one individual (the mother) and another (the blastocyst) begins. As development continues this physiological link becomes both stronger (12) and more obvious. First the woman realises that she is pregnant, then the father, relatives and friends are informed, eventually even complete strangers will know of the pregnancy due to the physical appearance of the woman. As these outward changes in appearance occur, so too do inward changes. At the end of the eighth week of gestation all the major structures and organ systems are developing and electroencephalogram (EEG) activity is first detectable. At this stage a recognisable physical form has been reached. The first movement of the fetus is felt by the mother at approximately 20 weeks. This brings a special and traditional meaning to the progressing pregnancy as it gives a sign to the mother, exclusive of medical technology, that the developing fetus is alive and growing inside her. By the 26-28th week of gestation the lungs are sufficiently developed to be able to breathe air and the fetus would be able to survive in the external environment. (At this stage the desire of the woman to terminate her pregnancy is in practice separable from the potential for the baby to survive.)
In the usual course of events, as this fetal development occurs there is a gradual increase in the hopes and expectations ofparents, relatives and friends as it becomes increasingly more certain that a baby will soon be 'joining the family'. Thus, a very special place is created in a community for the developing individual long before it has arrived 'on the scene'. This preparation of a social 'niche' establishes the fetus in an interpersonal and social context and further highlights the developing interaction which is present even before birth has occurred. From the point ofviability the fetus is able to be born and participate, not just as a 'potential baby' but as an actual, identifiable individual in the social community.
After entering that community, at birth, the individual gradually develops the ability to communicate, conceptualise and rationalise. Thus she has a place in the moral system, based on her identity, developing personality, mental life and experiences.
As a result, she shows increasing embeddedness in human interactions and takes a fully reciprocal, participating role.
So, a distinct individual enters the human community by forming interactions which are at first relatively simple and then later more complex emotional, social and moral engagements. But notice that the extended form of humanity entails that an identifiable individual who will at some stage be a rational social being with full moral rights is in existence from very early on. Thus, from implantation the individual participates in an interaction which normally leads to full moral engagement. Because that individual has moral significance at its point of full human engagement, all phases of that individual share the moral properties involved.
The individual can therefore be regarded as part of the moral community at all stages of development and as becoming increasingly embedded in a more complex and compelling way as it develops, so that at some point it realises the mode or form of being which is the basis of its extended moral properties.
Summary of the present argument We can now justify a relative sanctity for all human life. The justification is that to violate that life does violence to a basic feature of our moral attitudes.
This sanctity is attached to the human form as a whole where that form is viewed in a longitudinal sense and therefore present from conception and onwards throughout an entire life (13) . The basis of this moral value is the human ability to interact with others in those situations where moral sense and morality are grounded (14) .
All phases of the longitudinal form of a human being are aspects of the morally valued (unitary) whole and therefore all phases are morally valued in the same way. As the preimplantation period, whilst having no component of interaction, is part of that whole the preimplantation embryo is also seen 
Questions and caveats
In our society we draw lines. Western society says that adolescence begins with the onset of the teenage years; in the law an individual becomes a legal adult for some purposes on her eighteenth birthday and for others on her sixteenth (15) . This encourages us to appeal to more occurrently realised properties and to favour a system where moral status is seen to be derived from the individual's stage of development. But, despite claims to the contrary (16), these lines are for convenience and, although each has a rationale, the exact points are largely arbitrary.
The development to adult form is a progression through a series of stages which merge into each other. There is a continuity of growth from blastocyst to born child, to adult and further. Because of this continuity it is impossible to identify specific points where significant change occurs. For instance, it is not possible to identify the specific point in time when the child ceases and the adolescent begins, or the adolescent ends and the adult begins. Therefore, we can see that it is more accurate (but also less convenient as far as the law is concerned) to say that form changes gradually over a period of time rather than changing suddenly. These points are familiar from arguments by Michael Tooley (17) and Bernard Williams (18) .
When we add the premise that moral value attaches to the total (longitudinal) form in virtue of its most clearly morally endowed points we can see that moral (and legal) consideration is due to a human being from the beginning of the process until the end.
Against this one could argue that mere physiological interaction is not sufficient to give moral significance. It could be said that the social or rational element must be included before significance is properly ascribed (even at a minimal level). If physical interaction alone were morally significant we would be faced with the dilemma of having to treat an attached parasite, such as a tapeworm, with the moral consideration given an embryo or fetus. But this neglects the longitudinal 'form of a person'. There is a fundamental difference in form between a tapeworm and a human organism: an internal parasite simply grows and reproduces further parasites but a human embryo becomes a person with an interactive role in a human community. This creates a moral difference.
The same applies to a blastocyst which forms a hydatidiform mole instead of an embryo; it does not have the intrinsic potential to become a human being. Of course, given present medical technology, one cannot ascertain, prospectively, which will develop to term, which will spontaneously abort and which will become hydatidiform moles. Therefore all blastocysts must be considered to have the same moral status until the time when overall longitudinal form can be determined. In some cases this will not be until after birth.
Notice A 'total process' approach has the right implications for other problem cases. For instance it allows us to act consistently towards individuals who are asleep, under anaesthesia or in reversible comas. Knowing that the individual has both a past ability and a potential future ability to interact in a moral and social community one can credit that individual with default intentional interests which the present circumstances do not allow her to express (19) . It However, an excessively cognitive reading of morally significant interactions leads to problems. If one's ability to think and interact/communicate were to be graded, the individual whose form included the ability to interact on some yet to be defined 'higher plane' than others would be more important than other human beings. Perhaps a person whose total form included being a university professor would be more significant than an individual who was mildly intellectually handicapped. This immediately suggests an elitist attitude congenial to 'ivory towered academics' but not to 'normal' people. It does not seem to be a valid way to arrive at a conception of the person as the bearer of moral value. And, who is to say whether interaction with a three-month-old baby by nose-touching and noises is more or less valuable than a philosophical discussion with a twelve-year-old? We must beware ofplacing gratuitous value judgements on the type of interaction occurring. They are different types of interaction yet have both intrinsic value and value because they are parts of valued wholes, wholes which at some stage participate in moral interactions.
The moral significance of the age at which an individual dies can also be related to the natural unfolding of human form. We intuitively feel more sorrow at the death of a seven-year-old than that of a seventy-year-old, despite there being no difference in their moral value. Our different reactions are understandable. The death of a seventy-year-old is more consistent with the total form of humanity whereas the death of a seven-year-old does greater violence to the form which we value.
The question ofthe status ofanimals is also pertinent to the discussion. We see interactions between animals and humans. These are often complex and not infrequently of a similar nature to that seen between two human beings. If we are not to place value judgements on either the type of interaction or the species involved then it would seem that we have to consider animals in a similar, (potential/relational based) light to humans.
But the death of a human touches more closely the form that we value than the death of an animal. The form of an animal does not include a phase of full moral interaction, although at a minimal level some animals may interact with us as fully as do individuals with severe intellectual handicaps. Our reasoning is sensitively tied to many aspects of form, including bodily resemblance. In the case of some severely handicapped infants this inclines us to greater moral concern than, perhaps, is well-grounded (7).
However, this analysis seems to suggest that infanticide is no worse than contraception using the 'morning after' pill. This is decidedly counterintuitive, and in pursuing the issue we come across an already encountered feature of human reasoning. We reason on the basis of total processes, not moments in being. It seems rational to regard a setback at an earlier, indeed vestigial stage of a process as being of much less moment than when things have developed more fully (compare a mechanical failure on the number one spot of a formula one grid as compared to the final lap of the race when one is leading). Yet this seems to counter the intuition justifying our reaction to death at different ages (see above). The 'violence to overall form' argument appears to mitigate against early termination whereas the 'natural investment' reasoning is more tolerant. Here it seems that we cannot easily opt for a single moral precept to capture the subtlety of our natural reasoning.
Our attitudes are based on the total form of a human being and thus our moral reactions to events at any stage take account of the relationship between that stage and the whole. But also, we take reasonable note of the extent to which a process is realised when assessing the harm done by interrupting that process. But this latter claim does not strip all value from a very early stage of the total process even if it gives it lower value than a more fully formed stage. A possible reconciling strategy would therefore be to include the 'degree of realisation' intuition into an understanding of our attitude to the totality of a human life.
Thus we can see that it is right that a pregnant woman has the greater claim to life because of her present ability to interact with others in the human community. There is a much more fully formed process or morally important individual 'cut-off when one kills a developed human being. This does not negate the moral weight of a fetal life but merely suggests that in certain circumstances the risk to the mother is of greater moral weight. But, on this view, because the embryo is morally significant the risks posed to the mother by pregnancy must be significant or else an abortion cannot be morally justified (20 On the other hand, NBTs are beset with problems. Artificial reproduction does not simply fulfil the desires of an adult it also manufactures humans and in doing so may trivialise the ability to reproduce (21) . The ability to create human life in an artificial manner may undermine or even negate the value that the embryonic phase of the human form ought to be given. The high cost to the user of such techniques (in some countries at least) and the lengths to which one has to go to get access to them may induce the attitude that the babies produced are a commodity available to a highly motivated group of people with the ability to pay. We may come to view babies as 'tailor made products' to be produced to specifications (for example, gender), when and where wanted. These possibilities and their moral implications are unsettling. In addition NBTs carry significant risk of multiple pregnancy (see fig 1 (22) ). Multiple pregnancies, particularly those of quadruplet or greater (high-order), carry high risk to the health of both the fetuses and the mother. Because all these lives have moral worth it is inappropriate that such risks should be taken.
NBTs create the situation where multiple lives are at risk. Because of this we cannot easily assimilate the embryos to survivors in an overcrowded lifeboat. Therefore, we cannot argue that there is no problem because a hypothetical rational negotiation justifies an impartial selective reduction (the Rawlsian model (23) ) and provide an ethical solution to a medically-created problem of high-order pregnancy. In the case of NBTs one has control, so to speak, over whether or not the lifeboat is set out to sea. It is clear that deliberately setting the boat adrift with prior knowledge that some of its occupants must be destroyed, if any are to reach safety at a later stage, is a morally suspect choice to make (24).
But we can avoid some of these harms by controlling the aspects of NBTs which lead to the incidence of high-order multiple pregnancy (ie a pregnancy of four or greater). In fact there are already techniques available to achieve this control. This allows us to defend ourselves against callous and dismissive moral attitudes to embryos in general, given that they are proper stages of morally significant beings, without defending the notion of individual and personal rights for any embryo. Any rights that an embryo has ofan individual nature will attach to it only as a consequence of it having reached the stage where such attributions become intelligible. This argument is supported by considering the indiscernability of substituting one (consanguineous) embryo for another prior to the stage of engagement with others as an identifiable individual. This cannot be materially (and therefore morally) relevant to anyone: not the mother or others because they do not and could not tell the difference; not the embryo because it cannot tell or have attitudes to anything. It is clear that the condition of substitutability and lack of individuation is steadily replaced by properties, both intrinsic and relational which ground individual rights, as the child develops and takes its (interactive) place in a human context.
